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Abstract: Libya is unlike other states in North Africa mainly because of the distinctive 
arrangement of different socio-economic and political features it combines. This 
arrangement came into sharper focus in the wake of the recent collapse of its 40-year-old 
authoritarian regime. What had begun as a series of peaceful protests against the regime’s 
administrative misconducts became a full-scale confrontation between, increasingly 
frustrated crowds of protesters and ever-more violent regime forces and their supporters. It 
cannot be denied that the mobilization of Libyan dissidents was inspired by the preceding 
popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Just days after the collapse of the Mubarak regime, 
multiple street protests erupted across Libya. Even if one accepts the argument that the 
Libyan revolt was inspired by events outside the country, however, this does not explain 
why this popular uprising took such a significantly different path to those of its neighbors. 
This paper contextualizes the collapse of the Libyan regime by exploring the country’s 
various features and analyzing the mobilization process of different groups of anti-regime 
activists. The paper further presents a critical understanding of the progression of the 
mobilization process, the fall of the Qaddafi establishment and the immediate results of the 
regime change, all of which are considerably different from what has taken place elsewhere 
in the region.
Key words: Libyan Revolution, February 17, Arab Spring, Qaddafi, National Transitional 
Congress
Introduction
The 2011 Libyan revolution is a case of a popular uprising against long-term 
authoritarianism  that  transformed  into  a  civil  conflict  and  was  ultimately 
decided through the direct military involvement of a coalition of foreign states. 
This paper is primarily concerned with mapping the progression of the uprising 
from below. In order to analyze the various aspects of the progression, the paper 
is divided into five parts. The transitional period is covered first. This includes 
the most significant events from the initial days of the revolt to the handing over 
of political control of the state institutions to an elected representative body. The 
second part deals in a more in-depth manner with the actual evolution of protest 
events.  Much of the focus here will be on explaining how initially the peaceful 
mobilization of anti-regime activists evolved into a full-scale armed rebellion 
against  the  regime’s  (para)  military  forces.  The  third  part  covers  structural 
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conditions in order to situate the transition period and its main outcomes more 
closely. This adds to the overall explanation of the dynamic of socio-political 
transition and a set convolutions produced within a new political frame. The last 
part addresses the specific actors involved in the mobilization process and in 
shaping the transitional process more closely.
Periodization of the Transition
There are five major periods of political  transition in Libya, stretching from 
January 13 2011 to August 8 2012.  The first period lasted from January 13 to 
February 14. During this time a limited number of popular protests took place in 
several coastal cities including Benghazi and the desert city Bani Walid. It was 
on January 13 that several demonstrations against state corruption took place in 
several  eastern and western cities (Abdel-Baky, 2011).  Initially,  the regime’s 
response was to tolerate  limited demonstrations through which people could 
critique local institutions or the inefficient distribution of government services. 
Some of these protests were primarily concerned with the delayed completion 
of housing projects in the coastal regions concerned.1 Some groups of protesters 
in  Benghazi  and  Bani  Walid  occupied  several  hundred  uninhabited,  half-
finished buildings,  effectively becoming squatters  (Egypt Independent 2011). 
Qaddafi had even responded positively to their actions, allowing the squatters to 
continue inhabiting these buildings as their right. The regime reacted quickly to 
the protesters’ demands by putting in place a US$ 24 billion investment fund, 
thus directly addressing the housing development crisis (Reuters 2011). Despite 
this immediate government reaction the protests continued, but with a change in 
their focus and aims.
The January protests rapidly turned into political rallies with an entirely 
different rationale. Some of the demonstrations were organized by the families 
of prisoners killed in the 1996 Abu Salim prison massacre (HRW 2003; Reuters 
2009; Dziadosz 2011). The regime became increasingly violent in its responses 
to  demonstrators  and  thus  provoked  even  greater  grievances,  primarily  in 
Benghazi where the anti-regime protests were most vocal.
The second period in the transition period started on February 15 when 
the largest series of demonstrations took place. Such events had been virtually 
unheard  of  during the  42-year-rule  of  army Colonel  Mu’ammar  Qaddafi  (d. 
2011).  Benghazi  became  the  eastern  base  of  the  anti-regime  protests,  as  it 
represented  a  long-time  rival  to  the  central  power  in  Tripoli  in  the  west. 
However, it was not the only site of popular protest. Major cities in the west, 
including Zawiya, Misrata and even the capital Tripoli all experienced large-
scale anti-regime demonstrations in mid-February 2011. What set the east and 
west Libyan cities apart was the regime’s preparedness for such popular unrest. 
1 Some 540,000 housing units were planned and expected to be completed by 2010. See “Libya’s path from 
desert to modern country – complete with ice rink”, Christian Science Monitor, 12 July 2010.
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The Qaddafi  regime anticipated some public  disturbance in  the wake of  the 
Tunisian and Egyptian revolts. It is thus important to situate these mid-February 
protests in the wider context of regional events.  These public protests were in 
fact directly related to Tunisian and Egyptian mass-demonstrations and the fall 
of the authoritarian regimes in these countries. It can be argued that the fall of 
Egypt’s authoritarian regime on February 11, only four days before the modest 
start of the Benghazi protests, had a strong impact on popular perceptions of the 
effectiveness of mass protests against a repressive regime. 
The  third  period  started  on  February  17.  As  the  protests  and  regime 
responses  spiraled  into  violent  confrontations,  the  security  forces  and 
disorganized  groups  of  demonstrators  started  to  re-group  and  strategize  the 
continuing conflict.  Initially, disorganized groups, usually made up of a couple 
of hundred demonstrators, managed to incite larger crowds of people to join the 
violent  clashes  with  the  regime  forces  in  the  eastern  urban  centers.  The 
protesters  started  to  raid  local  security  forces’  headquarters,  thereby 
accumulating weapons and ammunition. The regime quickly blocked all social 
network sites, Al-Jazeera, youtube, and other Internet-based media outlets. At 
this point, the revolutionaries resorted to wireless communication technology. 
GSM mobile and satellite phones became by far the most important devices in 
coordinating the revolutionaries’ actions throughout the country. 
In the latter half of February fatalities among the protesters in Benghazi 
reached between 300-400 people, while the government forces counted more 
than 150 casualties (FIDH 2011; Schemm 2011). Violent clashes then spread 
quickly to the capital, Misrata (the third largest city), Ajdabiya and other cities. 
Within  days  several  important  government  officials  had  resigned  from their 
posts  and  joined  the  opposition.  Among  the  most  important  names  were 
Qaddafi’s  Justice  Minister,  Mustafa  Abdul  Jaleel  (February  21)  and  Interior 
Minister Abdul-Fattah Yunis (February 22), who was also an Army General and 
went on to head a large part of the opposition forces. These defections seem to 
signal  a  turning  point  in  the  coalescence  of  the  opposition  and  ultimately 
resulted in the formation of the opposition’s coordinating body, the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) on February 27 (Abbas and Blair 2011).
As the civil conflict progressed the international community expressed its 
concerns  for  the safety  of  the  civilian population in  the  east  of  the country 
through the United Nations Security Council, as Qaddafi’s forces and loyalists 
rapidly gained ground in the conflict. The Security Council, on the initiative of 
the  U.S.,  UK  and  France,  drew  up  a  resolution  which  would  allow  the 
enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya in order to alleviate the immediate 
suffering  of  the  civilian  population  (see  Fahim  et  al 2011).  UN  (Security 
Council) resolution 1973 was thus approved on March 17, at which point U.S. 
and  French  war  ships  in  the  Mediterranean  started  to  bomb  the  advancing 
Qaddafi  forces on the outskirts  of  Benghazi,  allowing the rebels  to  advance 
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towards  the  west  (United  Nations  2011).  Even  though  resolution  1973  was 
primarily concerned with establishing a no-fly-zone over Libyan territory, its 
primary effect was to give NATO forces legitimacy to bomb Qaddafi forces at 
any time and any place. 
In the aftermath of the conflict it may certainly be debated whether the 
military engagement in Libya was pre-planned to remove the rogue Qaddafi 
regime and replace it with a friendlier regime, to protect the civilian population, 
or  simply  a  political  step  to  assist  the  democratization  of  Northern  Africa.2 
Whatever the underlying motives for the involvement of foreign military forces 
in  the  Libyan  civil  war,  the  open  war  between  Qaddafi’s  forces  and  the 
revolutionary forces under the coordination of the NTC effectively ended on 
October 23, 2011 (Saleh and Rohan 2011).
The fourth period of the transition is that between the end of the conflict 
in October 2011 and the parliamentary elections in July 2012. This period is 
perhaps  the  most  vibrant  in  terms  of  the  democratization  process.  Multiple 
political  parties,  media  organizations,  civil  society  groups  and  civil  rights 
associations were formed, all in a near total absence of any particular judicial or 
political framework. At the same time, during this period high levels of tension 
and insecurity could also be observed, but also hope and innovativeness among 
many  of  the  non-violent  activists  (Parker  2011;  IRIN 2011;  Foundation for 
Future 2011). 
The fifth period stretches from the parliamentary elections of July 7 2012 
to  the  official  power-transfer  from  the  NTC  to  the  newly  elected  Libyan 
parliament on August 8. The period is marked by the end of the civil conflict 
between Qaddafi forces and NTC supporters. The campaign period saw between 
2500 and 3000 (about 500 female) candidates for 120 independent seats, 142 
registered political parties (ca. 1200 candidates contesting 80 seats), for a total 
of 3700 – 4200 candidates contesting 200 assembly seats (Coker 2012; Khan 
2012). In accordance to the population distribution, western Libya is allotted 
120 seats and the east the remaining 80 seats. This is controversial and is likely 
to continue to fuel already existing grievances and a sense of injustice directed 
at Tripoli. Voices among prominent tribes in the east have already articulated 
their desire to establish an independent entity and adopt a federation system for 
the new state. Even if this regional contention is still under debate, it is unlikely 
to cause the division of the nation. It will continue however to sustain tensions, 
principally among the political and economic elites (Kane 2012). 
2 Although beyond the scope of this paper it is worth noting that NATO’s Libyan involvement can be linked to 
the military organization’s intervention in Kosovo against Serbia and its military infrastructure. In Kosovo, 
NATO airstrikes enabled the Kosovo-Albanian forces (UCK) to capture most of the territory of Kosovo. This ul-
timately allowed Kosovo-Albanians to declare independence in 2008. Subsequently, the elected Kosovo govern-
ment was extraordinarily forthcoming on the U.S. security demands. I argue that the same logic drove the milit-
ary intervention of foreign powers during the Libyan civil war, based on similar expectations of access to stra-
tegically located natural resources and winning an important political ally in the region.
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In the wake of these five periods of transition and the beginning of a new 
phase of a democratization process we see tensions between tribal elites from 
east and west (Cyrenaica and Tripolitania). Various militias are linked to these 
elites, creating much insecurity within the country. In a worst case scenario this 
could cause a temporary or perpetual state of paralysis, particularly if the socio-
economic situation does not improve for the key social group (e.g. long-term 
unemployed youth) (see Dittrich 2011). Despite the successful election of the 
National Conference which represented the first elected Constituent Assembly, 
the process of transition is still incomplete (IRIN 2011). This initial phase of the 
transition period was concluded with Abdul Jaleel’s ceremonial handing over of 
political authority to the newly elected Libyan parliament on August 8, 2012 
(BBC News Africa,  2012).  Despite  this,  the  chances  of  successfully  placing 
Libya  on  the  right  track  soon  is  doubtful  in  light  of  the  surrounding 
complexities.
Protest
From the late 1990s on the Qaddafi regime made attempts to restructure the 
“institutional”  framework  of  its  domestic  rule.  The  turning  point  in  this 
“reform”  process  came  in  late  2003  when  the  regime  announced  it  was  to 
abandon its weapons of mass destruction project. This effectively meant that 
Libya could re-establish foreign relations with the U.S. and the EU (BBC News 
2003; UN Press Release 2004).  In the following years  there was a surge of 
international  interest  in  Libya’s  economy  in  general  and  its  oil  reserves  in 
particular. In 2004 Amnesty International (AI) was allowed to visit the country 
for the first time in 15 years. Claudio Cordone, the head of the AI delegation, 
stated that he was “pleased with the unprecedented access we were given to the 
Libyan authorities and others, particularly to prisoners. We look forward to a 
serious engagement by Libya with a process of accountability for past violations 
and reform for the future" (Amnesty International 2004). 
The AI visit marked the beginning of a domestic “reform” process where 
human rights were at least considered as an issue to be addressed. Sarah Leah 
Whitson, the director of Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) Middle East division 
had both praised  and encouraged the Libyan regime to  improve its  policies 
regarding human rights. "A public assessment of Libya's human rights record in 
Tripoli would have been unthinkable a few years ago and reflects the expanded 
space for public discussion in Libya. The government should revise its penal 
code to allow all Libyans the freedom to have such public discussion without 
fear of criminal sanction and stop jailing those who express criticism of the 
government, including Jamal el Haji (Human Rights Lawyer)" (HRW 2009; see 
also Amnesty International 2010). 
In the summer of 2007 Qaddafi decided to reform the state bureaucracy 
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by laying off more than a third of the entire state-employed administrative force 
(in  total  400.000  people).  All  those  affected  by  this  large  downsize  would 
receive full pay for three years. The unemployed would also have the possibility 
of receiving a state subsidy should they decide to start their own business. This 
radical  reform effort  appears  to  denote  Qaddafi’s  attempt  to  modernize  the 
Libyan economy and diminish the state’s dependence on oil revenues (Reuters 
2007). Furthermore, in 2007, shortly after Qaddafi released a team of Bulgarian 
nurses and a Palestinian doctor from an eight-year prison term for allegedly 
infecting over 400 young children with HIV, Libya was admitted to the UN 
Security council as a non-permanent member (Kaplan 2007). This was another 
major turning point in Libya’s foreign relations. 
With  regard to  the domestic  reform process,  in  2008 Qaddafi  himself 
made  a  noteworthy  remark,  which  could  be  interpreted  as  self-criticism 
concerning  the  increasingly  publically  criticized  corruption  of  the  civil 
administration.  In  a  public  speech  he  declared  his  wish  to  abolish  local 
(presumably regional or city) administrations altogether, thereby enabling the 
distribution  of  state  earnings  directly  to  the  population  (Pargeter  2010).  As 
noted before, the radical reorganization of the state bureaucracy was perhaps a 
significant sign that the regime had real intentions to reform the socio-economic 
basis  of  the  state.  During  this  period  a  large  number  of  Libya’s  university 
graduates  were  sent  by  the  state  to  EU countries  to  complete  post-graduate 
studies  in  exclusively  natural  science  disciplines  (e.g.  geology,  chemistry, 
biomedicine etc.) (interview nos. 1, 2, and 3).
As outlined, the gradual and radical change in the Libyan polity had been 
ongoing  since  the  late  1990s  and  certainly  had  an  effect  on  the  public’s 
perception  of  the  reform process,  and  perhaps  most  of  all  on  the  people’s 
expectations  as  to  its  development  (see  BBC  News 2006).  During  the  pre-
revolutionary period several public demonstrations took place. 
For instance, in the summer of 2000 a spontaneous and brief eruption of 
anti-regime  violence  followed  a  football  game  in  Benghazi.  When  Saadi 
Qaddafi’s  (Mu’ammar  Qaddafi’s  third  eldest  son)  Tripoli-based  soccer  team 
made an apparently fraudulent attempt to win a match against the Benghazi-
based  team of  the  same  name,  Al-Ahly,  a  crowd  of  several  thousand  fans 
stormed the  field,  interrupted  the  game,  and  later  spilled  out  on  the  streets 
shouting anti-Qaddafi (family) slogans (Mittelstaedt 2011; interview no. 2). The 
regime responded swiftly, imprisoning the Benghazi team’s management, some 
of the leading players, and an unknown number of protesting supporters, all of 
whom were  sentenced  to  long-prison  terms  and  a  few of  which  were  even 
sentenced to death (these sentences were later commuted) (Mittelstaedt 2011). It 
is important to note that some of the fiercest revolutionary units from Benghazi 
were organized by soccer fans supporting the local team, who were often seen 
dressed in team colors (interviews no. 2 and 3). The apparent thrust from soccer 
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fans  also  incited the regime to cancel  all  soccer  matches in  Libya after  the 
Egyptian  uprisings  (January  25,  2011),  thus  limiting  anti-regime  opposition 
opportunities to gather large numbers of people (interview nos. 1 and 3). Given 
the abovementioned notion that  the most  persistent  and frequently displayed 
public grievances had to do with the regime’s massacre of 1200 prisoners in a 
single day at Tripoli’s Abu Salim prison in 1996, it was likely that this point of 
contention would have heightened the risk of (violent) public protests.
Despite extremely high levels of repression in Libya, the reform process 
intensified during the mid-2000s. The regime’s opening to the outside world and 
giving in to (international)  political  and economic pressures also opened the 
way for domestic reforms (see HRW 2009). Even though these reforms mainly 
consisted of a change in the regime’s official rhetoric, the public’s expectations 
of the regime grew substantially (interview no. 2). In other words, there was an 
increase  in  subjective  expectations  for  freedom  that  became  manifest  in 
objective claims-making by the public. This development coincided felicitously 
with the sudden breakdown of the Tunisian authoritarian system in December 
2010.
The  very  core  of  the  Libyan  regime,  and  for  that  matter  the  former 
Tunisian and Egyptian regimes, had developed a “need” for sustained control 
over its population. This need refers to the power holders’ strong will for power 
which in turn incited them to mobilize the necessary resources to maintain the 
status quo. In the Libyan case all resources available to the regime were utilized 
(see Downie 2011). One can argue that the raison d’être of security institutions 
in Libya, as well in Egypt and Tunisia prior to their revolutions, was to enforce 
the authoritarian regime’s sovereignty over politics in the first instance, but also 
over religious practices,  media,  modes of public expression and other social 
activities (see Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Linz 2000). In other words, Qaddafi 
had used all of his personal influence in order to communicate his requests to 
the Libyan population. He had utilized all the Libyan institutional capacities and 
administrative  resources  as  mechanisms  of  coercion  with  the  intention  of 
forcing citizens to comply with regime policies (for a broader discussion see 
Davenport 2007). Evidently his efforts were not sufficient to keep the regime in 
power.  Nevertheless,  Qaddafi-style  totalitarianism  had  entailed  a  political 
culture that it was far more difficult to change. As discussed in the following, 
the Qaddafi regime, like many other authoritarian governments, did not operate 
exclusively through sheer force. It focused primarily on creating a sense of fear 
among citizens. Herein, presumably, one can find a large amount of individual 
actors  who feel  that  they have more to gain in life by remaining politically 
passive than by opposing the regime in power.
However,  something  changed  in  Libya  that  disrupted  the  public’s 
passivity, allowing them to overcome their fear. The Libyan popular uprising in 
February 2011 can be attributed first of all to a turning point in the growth of the 
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regime-critical section of the population, and, second, to the precipitous falls of 
the  two  neighboring  countries’ long-term  authoritarian  regimes.  These  two 
status quo disrupting processes contributed to  initiate  the first  period of  the 
transition during which popular demands for improved public services evolved 
into political claims-making events. These increasingly more demanding events 
climaxed on February 16 when about 500 people gathered in the central square 
of Benghazi to demonstrate against the regime. The seemingly well-prepared 
protesters seemed to have a particular demand, the release of several human 
rights advocates, including the lawyer Fathi Terbil arrested just days before. The 
protesters  used  gasoline-filled  bottles  as  home-made  bombs  and  on  this 
particular occasion the security forces cracked down on the protest first with 
water  cannons  and  then  with  rubber  bullets,  and  then  resorted  to  live 
ammunition (Cowell 2011; Reuters 2011b). The security forces were supported 
by civilians who were identified as Qaddafi loyalists (interview no. 3). 
Other cities, such as Bayda to the northeast of Benghazi, developed into 
demonstration hotspots which attracted the security forces’ attention and caused 
escalating violence between the growing amount of protesters and the police. 
For instance, as a result of swelling protests and violent security tactics a police 
station in Bayda was burned to the ground on February 16 (Gebauer 2011). In 
Benghazi  protesters  organized a  provisional  camp in the middle of  the city, 
mirroring  the  focal  protest  hub  against  the  regime  in  Cairo’s  Tahrir  square 
(Jacinto 2011).  The security forces quickly moved against  the demonstrators 
with  brutal  force.  Again,  in  Benghazi  a  large  part  of  the  demonstrators 
expressed long-held grievances, with many people were calling for justice for 
those families affected by the regime’s 1996 massacre of prisoners and voicing 
numerous other complaints against the regime’s policies. Aware of the danger 
the escalation of protests posed, the regime released over a hundred imprisoned 
Islamists, instantly signaling its increased concern to both the general public and 
the demonstrators (HRW 2003; ICG 2011; Cruickshank and Lister 2011).
The turning point
The escalating protests and regime violence hit a turning point on February 17 
2011, the anniversary of Benghazi’s anti-regime soccer rally. This was the day 
the protesters named the “Day of Rage”, again modeling their calls for regime 
change after Tunisia and Egypt. The importance of this date is emphasized here 
as it came to be the name the Libyan “revolutionaries” gave to their uprising 
(The 17 February Revolution), thus stressing the importance of the events that 
precipitated  on  that  day  (the  Guardian 2011b).  It  was  on  this  day  that  the 
overwhelmingly  peaceful  protests  began  to  turn  more  violent,  largely  in 
response  to  an  escalation  in  violence  by  the  security  forces  and  a  growing 
number of violent attacks by Qaddafi supporters (Amnesty International 2011c). 
Even though the security forces were amply armed, the key in their control of 
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the protesters had been the organization of Qaddafi loyalists. Furthermore, on 
February 17 protesters in the eastern city of Ajdabiya intensified their protests, 
which were met with sniper fire from security agents located on surrounding 
rooftops (Human Rights Council 2011, 23-26). The regime, anticipating fallout 
from the events of the day before, warned all mobile phone users through a text 
message  that  the  state  security  would  use  force  to  disperse  any  “collective 
activities that promote public sedition” (see Reporters Without Borders’ report 
2011).
The  regime  seems  to  have  anticipated  a  substantial  number  of 
demonstrations;  however,  the state  security forces were not  prepared to deal 
with the persistent nature of the protests. Added to this, it was possible to see 
that protests were emerging across the country, yet the mobilization was clearly 
more extensive in the east. Qaddafi tried to preempt the anticipated domestic 
protests  by  frequently  speaking  against  the  Tunisian  and  later  the  Egyptian 
uprisings,  warning  of  insecurity  and  socio-economic  chaos.  Despite  the 
regime’s media campaign forewarning the Libyan public, the majority of at least 
the male population clearly did not heed these warnings and many decided to 
protest  against  the regime (Weaver 2011).  The regime in turn backed up its 
threats by mobilizing all available means of coercion, initially to secure centers 
of regime power (i.e. the capital and other urban centers in Tripolitania) and 
later also the rebellious east. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  regime  could  not  have  anticipated  the  size, 
frequency and seemingly coordinated character of the protests. In the aftermath 
of  the  initial  wave  several  sources  from the  Libyan  opposition  in  absentia 
claimed that the actual coordination of the protests was carried out by exiled 
Libyans, primarily from the UK and Switzerland where the bulk of the Libyan 
opposition  was  based  (see  Global  Voices,  2011).  It  became  clear  that 
coordinated online call for protests in Libya came on Monday 14 February, just 
three days after the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt. The regime noticed 
these signals and intensified its efforts to secure control over the major western 
cities, including its power-base Tripoli. Subsequently, far fewer urban protest 
events got out of the control of the regime’s security forces in this part of the 
country, also due to the fact that the majority of the regime’s supporters were 
from this region. This combination of reasons resulted in a limited amount of 
popular protests in the west. Those groups of people who did decide to stage 
some kind of peaceful  protest  were quickly disbanded by the overwhelming 
force of the authorities (ICG 2011). In Cyrenaica the security situation from the 
regime’s  point  of  view  was  more  precarious.  The  regime’s  security  agents 
focused on targeting key opposition figures. Among those arrested on February 
14 and 15 was Fathi Terbil, a publicly recognized lawyer from Benghazi (BBC 
News 2011b). 
During  the  first  four  days  of  the  protests,  some  500-600  people 
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demonstrated in the two cities in the east; Benghazi and Ajdabiya stood out with 
the largest  crowds of protesters.  By Thursday 17 February, three people had 
been killed, which further incited people to gather and continue protesting. This 
element is highly important as it publicly demonstrated the regime’s willingness 
to resort  to extreme levels of violence to suppress even mild expressions of 
political opposition (Black and Bowcott, 2011).
The deployment of the army to suppress civilian demonstrations was one 
of the clearest signs of the regime’s brutality. In contrast, neither Tunisia nor 
Egypt initially deployed military forces against demonstrators.  On the 17th,  a 
Thursday, and the first day of the regular two-day weekend, many more people 
were able to join the initially small protest actions. This day marked the five-
year anniversary of the regime crackdown on protesters outside the Benghazi-
based Italian consulate that left more than ten people dead. The more than 1000 
people strong protest that day had been directed against Italian minister Roberto 
Calderoli’s publically wearing a t-shirt with Danish anti-Islam cartoons (BBC 
News 2006b).  The  regime’s  security  forces  attacked  large  crowds  of 
increasingly violent demonstrators causing widespread panic and deaths. The 
immediate consequence of the protesters’ deaths was the regime’s concern for 
potential larger protests, this time most likely against the regime. Qaddafi’s first 
decision was to replace his security Minister and initiate an investigation into 
the protesters’ deaths just a day after the events (Aljazeera 2006).
Even though the short-range consequences of the regime’s brutality did 
not result in increased numbers of protests, the long-term effects of these events 
were far more dramatic. This was primarily reflected in the persistency of the 
public memory of these events, as shown on February 17 2011. The persistency 
of the collective memory was primarily enabled through the dissemination of 
massive amounts of information about the demonstration, but also reinforced by 
previous examples of the regime’s brutality (e.g. the Abu Salim massacre, the 
frequent  disappearances  of  well-known  public  intellectuals,  everyday  police 
brutality, corruption etc.).  Also,  increased Internet  access enabled Libyans to 
share pictures and stories  of  these and other  events;  stories  of  massacres of 
civilians and the overall brutality of the regime were published online. This had 
an important effect on the type of the opposition in the making. It seems that 
both preemptive and reactionary regime violence were shaping an increasingly 
violent opposition. For instance, on the “Day of Rage” protesters, apparently in 
response  to  the  security  services’  deadly  violence,  began  occupying  the 
government’s weapons depots - often adjacent to police stations and military 
compounds.  This  was  done  in  order  to  equip  the  increasing  number  of 
“revolutionaries”  (thuwar),  as  the  opposition  activists  had begun to  refer  to 
themselves. 
In the aftermath of this turning point there was increased militarization on 
both sides. The regime, despite its control of the bulk of the regular Libyan 
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army,  deployed  a  significant  amount  of  foreign  mercenaries.  This  was 
considered a viable alternative to replace a number of army brigades which had 
defected to the revolutionaries (Amnesty International 2011d). From that point 
on it is hard to speak of activist protests in any conventional sense. The vast 
majority of demonstrators had instead organized into urban guerillas amassing 
military equipment and using army tactics in order to force the regime to give 
up  power.  On the  political  side  of  the  opposition,  the  National  Transitional 
Council (NTC) coordinated the leading opposition figures, consisting primarily 
of the domestic regime defectors still in the country. The NTC and the main 
bulk of the opposition forces were based in the city of Benghazi, which came 
under the control of the opposition early on.
Activists
Who  formed  the  main  bulk  of  the  revolutionaries?  The  vast  majority  of 
opposition actors can be divided into four distinguishable groups. First, there 
were  exiled  Libyans  who actively  protested  against  the  Qaddafi  regime  for 
years  in  both  the  EU  and  the  U.S.  (see  Ahmida  2012).  These  in-absentia 
activists played an important role in the early stages of the popular uprising as 
they communicated  with their  families,  friends  and other  activists  in  Libya. 
Since the Qaddafi regime tightly controlled the Libyan state media, the exiled 
opposition  played  an  important  role  as  information  hubs  for  the  domestic 
opposition.  Through  this  intense  (Internet-based)  communication  the  exiles 
conveyed  unfiltered  information  on  the  ongoing  revolutions  in  Tunisia  and 
Egypt.3 This  seems  to  have  helped  to  boost  the  morale  of  the  anti-regime 
activists (interview no. 1). Moreover, the role of the opposition abroad was also 
operational  in  phase  two  of  the  transition.  For  instance,  several  leading 
members of the organized opposition had resided in the U.S. since the 1980s, 
where  they created  the  National  Front  for  the  Salvation  of  Libya  under  the 
guidance of Ibrahim Sahad. The majority of the organized opposition, including 
Sahad,  were  former  Libyan  diplomats,  government  and  military  officials. 
Several sources indicate the Front worked closely with the NTC in establishing 
independent  communication  networks  for  coordinating  the  revolutionaries’ 
actions against the regime very early on (Elkin 2012; interview no. 2). 
Second,  a  part  of  the  domestic  opposition  consisting  of  defected 
government  officials,  including  some  high-profile  figures  such  as  Mustafa 
Abdul  Jalil  (former  Minister  of  Justice),  Abdul-Fattah  Yunis  (Minister  of 
Interior), Mahmoud Jibril (former head of National Planning Council of Libya, 
an inter-governmental body set up by Saif al-Qaddafi to introduce a neo-liberal 
economic system in Libya), Ali Essawi (former deputy foreign minister), a late 
defector and Qaddafi’s close aid Abdel-Salam Jalloud, as well as several other 
3 According to the data from the World Bank report over 10% of Libyans reside abroad, which is a 
disproportionately large figure compared to similar countries in peace time (WDI 2010).
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important personalities such as the symbolically important Ahmed al-Senussi, a 
great-nephew of King Idris released from prison in 2001 after being jailed for 
more  than  30  years.  Al-Senussi  lent  the  NTC  and  the  opposition  further 
legitimacy in the face of increased violence in the Qaddafi regime, which was 
progressively losing its grip on the Libyan people and territory. The main bulk 
of NTC members were thus organized by former government officials,  well-
educated émigré opposition figures and traditional tribe representatives. In the 
initial  stages  of  the  revolutionary  events,  primarily  in  the  east,  the  NTC 
succeeded  in  establishing  and  legitimizing  an  alternative  “government”. 
Through this newly established government the opposition leaders could voice 
their demands directed both at the regime, foreign governments, international 
organisations, and most importantly voice their support and encouragement to 
their  domestic  audiences  and  attempt  to  coordinate  the  mobilization  of  the 
masses of anti-regime activists (Bell and Witter 2011). In the third phase the 
NTC played the role of de-facto government, organizing the first  democratic 
elections in Libya’s history (see Reuters 2011c).
Third, the youth section of the anti-Qaddafi opposition made up the vast 
majority of the revolutionary forces. These youths were and still are generally 
unemployed young men. The demographic youth boom (15-24 years old)  in 
Libya  peaked  in  2000,  and  more  than  70%  of  these  young  people  were 
unemployed  compared  to  the  total  employable  numbers  in  the  Libyan 
population (UNDP 2011;  the Economist 2011). If one considers the pyramid-
like population distribution affected by mass-unemployment, where almost 90% 
of the population resides in urban areas, the social situation is clearly highly 
volatile. The volatility in Libya rose to a degree where - despite high levels of 
state repression and intimidation - the population rebelled. The environment of 
regional popular uprisings added important moral incitements to the anti-regime 
protests.  This  can  be  situated  in  an  historical  perspective  according to  Jack 
Goldstone, who argues that any social environment enduring “youth bulge” is 
more  likely  to  experience  more  socio-political  volatility  in  comparison  to  a 
society  not  experiencing  this  phenomenon  (Goldstone  2002).  The  above-
mentioned state restructuring process caused deepening unemployment starting 
in 2007 which in turn contributed if not to economic hardship then at least to 
political restlessness among a major part of the population (see ICG 2011b). 
The spontaneous protests of young men initiated through and by soccer matches 
demonstrated this volatility well in Libya. In other words, housing challenges in 
the already highly urbanized Libya became another point of friction between 
youth and the regime. In this traditional and conservative society, marriage was 
encouraged  and  a  virtual  necessity  if  people  of  opposite  genders  were  to 
cohabit. When the regime failed to meet housing demands this further fuelled 
the  anti-regime  mobilizations,  now assuming  an  increasingly  violent  profile 
(interviews no. 1 and 3).
Fourth,  women  represented  an  important  part  of  the  popular  protests 
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despite their seemingly low-profile activism. As Libya is a conservative Muslim 
society the intermingling of the sexes was limited during protest events (see also 
OECD 2009). For instance, women were the primary initiators of early protests 
in  the  first  phase  of  the  transition.  Their  principal  demands  concerned  the 
whereabouts of their relatives’ bodies killed in the Abu Salim massacre in 1996. 
Many of the kin of political prisoners took this opportunity to seek information 
about  their  incarcerated  husbands,  brothers,  and  sons  held  in  state  prisons 
(interview  no.  3).  During  the  third  phase  of  the  transition  women  did  not 
participate in violent clashes, but still played a key role in supporting the anti-
regime forces with medical and food supplies. Many of the women sold their 
gold jewelry in order to finance purchases of weapons and other supplies (ICG 
2011b). Due to a deep-rooted culture of honor with regard to gender roles in 
Libya, women seem to have been frequent targets for the regime forces during 
the  civil  conflict  (Wueger  2012).  This  further  antagonized  the  anti-regime 
activists,  adding  to  the  existing  hatred  of  Qaddafi  and  the  old  power 
establishment. This can be added to the context and circumstances under which 
Mu’ammar Qaddafi was captured, or rather lynched by the armed masses, and 
killed.
Demands
The popular demands of the demonstrations that took place from early 2011 
until the end of power handover by the NTC to the newly elected parliament 
clustered around three issues: a) the improvement of government services (e.g. 
by  ending  systemic  corruption),  b)  calling  for  justice  for  the  massacres  of 
prisoners in 1996 (similar claims were aired by other protesters requesting the 
government  to provide justice  for  past  misdeeds),  and c)  gradually evolving 
calls for “the fall of the regime”, including the demands for the establishment of 
a  democratic  polity  in  Libya.  The  progression  of  protesters’ demands  from 
popular calls for improved state services and economic accountability to direct 
political requests and regime change is similar to the progression of protests in 
both Tunisia and Egypt. 
The regime responded to the first set of demands by specifically dealing 
with the acute housing shortage throughout the northern provinces. Other sets of 
demands dealing with calls for justice for previous security incidents were not 
however responded to in any substantial way. Instead, the regime felt threatened 
by the increased politicization of protests and thus initiated a media campaign in 
order to discredit the activists. Moreover, the civilian security services began to 
be supported by the army in policing the protests; this continued to the point 
when the activists turned into outright rebels (interviews no. 2 and 3). 
The evolution of initially modest popular protests over the course of a 
relatively short period of time (January-February) seems to have been highly 
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influenced  by  the  popular  revolts  in  Tunisia  and  Egypt,  Libya’s  immediate 
neighbors. The similar spirals of demands originally addressing corruption and 
the  authorities’  ineptitude  quickly  developed  into  political  demonstrations 
demanding regime change in these countries too (ref.). If we compare the most 
vocal demands of the popular protests in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya at the height 
of  their  respective revolts  we see  that  calls  for  dignity,  freedom and justice 
through the deposing of repressive regimes are the most  frequent  (Aljazeera 
2011). There were instead very few calls,  if any, for more job opportunities, 
improved economic conditions, better education or other similar issues invoked 
as primary causes of the revolts (Michael 2011).4 With regard to the Internet as 
an important “public” forum for airing demands, it can be argued that the initial 
low cost of participating in online regime dissent contributed to the widespread 
diffusion of claims-making. The claims made online were usually broad and 
based on general grievances with the political system with no or little debate on 
everyday (e.g. policy) issues. It could be argued that the radical progression of 
the transformation of the Libyan protests also brought about a radical change in 
peoples’ consciousness,  a  more profound and long-lasting  change than mere 
regime shift.
Libyan popular protests grew into a popular upheaval that took place in 
stages throughout January and February 2011, as explained previously. To talk 
about protest events in the classical sense is therefore meaningless at this point. 
What was observed on the streets of major cities throughout northern Libya was 
a  relatively  brief  period  of  demonstrations.  These  events  were  reticent 
expressions of long-held grievances funneling into mass-demonstrations in the 
months following the Tunisian revolution and just days after the overthrow of 
the Egyptian authoritarian president. It is therefore important to note that the 
spiraling of Libyan protests into civil war took place against the background of 
the Tunisian and Egyptian public revolts against the authoritarian regimes of 
Ben Ali and Mubarak respectively.
Furthermore, the anti-Qaddafi  opposition, or rather anti-regime groups, 
seemed to grew bolder as massive amounts of young unemployed men began to 
join frequent and sporadic demonstrations. Such events were quickly attacked 
and  dispersed  by  the  heavily  armed  security  forces.  One  major  difference 
between  the  Libyan revolt  and the  revolutions  in  Tunisia  and Egypt  is  that 
middle-class bureaucrats and professionals were largely absent in shaping the 
core of the cycle of protest and the outcome of the civil war (Lacher 2011). 
4 It can be argued that the initial causes of early protests in Libya (both in 2010 and January 2011) were delays 
in housing developments, the authorities’ economic mismanagement and accusations of rampant administrative 
corruption. Nevertheless, when the political claims started to be made by the protesters social demands turned 
into far more radical requests – i.e. replacing the entire political system.
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Protest forms
It  is  difficult  to  speak  meaningfully  here  of  any  lasting  protest  campaigns, 
strikes, petitions or the like due to the lack of organized groups in Libyan civil 
society, as such groups are usually the instigators of such collective actions. 
Qaddafi-prompted  local  revolutionary  councils,  for  instance,  essentially 
functioned  as  public  information  hubs  where  regime  informants  could  pass 
relevant  information  on  to  the  mukhabarat (state  security),  but  also  where 
people  received relevant  information from the regime.  Most  importantly  the 
local  councils  represented  a  symbol  of  Qaddafi’s  ideological  construct 
(Jamahiriyyah)  where  people  were,  at  least  symbolically,  offered  the 
opportunity to participate in decision-making processes directly concerned with 
their immediate surroundings.
The regime’s violent response to initially peaceful protests in the urban 
centers across northern Libya following the fall of the Egyptian regime resulted 
in more violent anti-regime mobilization. The regime’s uncompromising stance 
towards demonstrators instigated an escalation in the protesters’ use of violence. 
Even though the initial lack of a unified opposition caused massive confusion 
among  the  protesters,  the  rapid  escalation  of  violence  between  the  regime 
authorities and anti-regime activists, the outcome of the first days of the revolt 
(i.e. 15-18 February 2011) necessitated the coordination of opposition efforts. 
Initial  high-level  defectors  from the  regime  contributed  much  needed 
political  and  military  leadership,  which  in  turn  facilitated  much  needed 
logistical knowledge in creating an opposition structure within the increasingly 
violent conflict. Moreover, it seems that the availability of Internet connections 
and  other  information  technology  devices  (e.g.  mobile  and  satellite  phones, 
radio  etc.)  further  met  the  need  for  inexpensive  modes  of  information 
dissemination and the coordination of political and military activities among the 
relatively fragmented sections of the political opposition (i.e. the NTC’s various 
branches, its armed wing and the numerous local militias). This is relevant as 
the main bulk of opposition organizers, if not the outright leaders, were based 
abroad.  The  increased  availability  of  Internet  services  and  relatively 
underdeveloped  state  mechanisms  for  controlling  information  flows  allowed 
opposition  groups  to  communicate,  exchange  information,  discuss  and 
coordinate activities to some extent. 
Some evidence for this inability is to be found in the regime’s targeted 
arrests rather than sweeping wave of repression against regime-critical Internet 
users.  For  instance,  the  Libyan  security  services  arrested  one  of  the  better-
known domestic dissidents, Jamal al-Hajji, due to his regime critical statements 
posted online. Al-Hajji had been a vocal critic of the judicial process in Libya 
since working as a lawyer dealing with many civil cases involving the defense 
of political dissidents (Amnesty International 2011; 2011b). The large amount 
of critical posts, streams and private forum discussions overwhelmed the state 
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security’s capacity to control, follow up and oversee the anti-regime activities 
efficiently however. Despite this weakness, the regime kept targeting what they 
saw as the most precarious elements of the opposition, that is intellectuals (see 
Freedom in the World (report) 2009).
As  Internet  communication  played  a  central  role  in  coordinating  the 
progressively  more  complex  operations  of  the  fragmented  opposition,  it  is 
necessary to address some of its main features. It has been established that the 
main part,  if not all  Libyan Internet communications ran via communication 
equipment (e.g. main servers, cables etc.) based in Tripoli. Cables branched out 
to  the rest  of  Libya from this  point.  It  was therefore relatively  easy for  the 
Qaddafi regime to cut off, or at least limit, cable-based Internet connections in 
those  areas  under  the  initial  control  of  the  opposition  (i.e.  the  NTC).  An 
unverified claim as to why this did not happen states that the regime did not 
possess  the  necessary  software  to  reconnoiter  the  vast  amount  of  skype 
communications (interview no.  3).  The skype software was one of  the most 
frequently  used  information  technology  devices  used  by  the  opposition  to 
communicate  with  the  outside  world  (interview  with  dissident  in  Sweden). 
Another explanation points to the strategic mistake made by the regime, which 
included  underestimating  the  opposition’s  ability  to  coordinate  its  military 
operations, which was correct for the first month of the conflict. Nevertheless, 
the opposition received much needed aid in terms of communication equipment, 
training and above all military support from a substantial number of countries 
and NATO.
In  2010,  due  to  the  overloaded  Internet  cable  connections  the  regime 
decided to expand the country’s Internet capacity by installing VSAT (wireless 
satellite)  connections which would run through Benghazi  and thus cover the 
exponential  growth in  Internet  use  in  the  country.  What  the  regime did  not 
anticipate;  however,  was  that  the  availability  of  IT  infrastructure  would 
ultimately  be  used  against  it.  It  was  no  accident  then  that  the  Benghazi 
revolutionaries aimed to take control of key government buildings including the 
(VSAT)  wireless  Internet  server  facilities  early  on  (Harrison  2012).  This 
ultimately meant that the information coming out of Benghazi and eastern Libya 
could  reach  both  domestic  and  foreign  audiences  instantaneously,  providing 
ample  information  about  the  advancing  Qaddafi  forces  and  effects  on  the 
civilian  population.  It  is  through  this  connection  that  the  famous  amateur 
journalist  Muhammed  Nabbous  reported  on  some  of  the  regime  forces’ 
atrocities and the regime’s responses to the U.N.’s requests for a ceasefire after 
Qaddafi’s troops stormed Benghazi (Media Spy 2011). He created the Al Hurra 
(Freedom)  Internet-TV channel  on  which  he  and  other  amateur  journalists 
posted a large amount of video/audio materials and which can still be accessed 
(Mohammed Nabbous interview, 2011).5 Nabbous was killed by a sniper  on 
March 19 2011. Incongruously, he was killed while reporting on the stability of 
5 http://www.livestream.com/libya17feb; see also http://www.mohamednabbous.com
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the Qaddafi regime’s ceasefire in the wake of the UN’s authorization of the use 
of force (see Wells 2011).
As the battles unfolded during the summer of 2011, the opposition forces 
advanced towards the east with constant support from NATO aerial forces. As 
Libyans  witnessed  the  fall  of  Tripoli  on  August  20th and  the  killing  of 
Mu’ammar Qaddafi and one of his sons in Sirte on October 20th, it became clear 
that  the  opposition  had  evolved  into  a  fragile  political  entity  composed  of 
different tribes, political and ideological groups.6 The NTC initially comprised 
political figures that had defected from the regime and key members from the 
local tribes who sought to bring as many Qaddafi loyalists over to their side 
through various methods. Given the obvious difficulty of establishing trust and 
reliability in en evolving and highly volatile civil conflict, many people fighting 
on the Qaddafi side of the conflict (arguably) wanted, but could not, defect due 
to the high risks of being caught and ultimately killed (interview no. 2; see CNN 
2011).  In  such  cases  family  and  tribal  connections  were  crucial  in 
communicating  their  loyalties  and  plans  to  defect  to  the  side  of  the 
revolutionaries and the anti-Qaddafi establishment (the NTC). This was done 
for two not necessarily separate reasons: a) in the case of the regime falling and 
investigations into who was a regime loyalist or revolutionary there would be 
proof to support their allegiance with the revolt, and b) outright commitment to 
the cause of overthrowing the regime regardless of the long term outcome of the 
rebellion.
The focus on a mobilization against a repressive regime outlined in this 
paper needs to be contextualized in relation to the regime’s responses and the 
dynamics, which, I argue, produced case-specific outcomes. Here the relations 
between  the  different  state  branches  (e.g.  government,  military,  security 
services, economic elites etc.) are immensely important as different aspects of a 
state converge in the repression of protests and opposition. The Qaddafi regime, 
despite its power advantage, needed the support of key groups in the society in 
order to weather an overwhelming popular revolt (see Delacoura 2012). When 
the regime lost the support of the key Libyan tribes as well as key individuals 
within  the  government  and  the  army,  the  authoritarian  structure  simply 
imploded under the weight of the growing opposition coalescence including an 
important element of foreign military intervention (see BBC 2011).
Several  of  the  revolutionaries  interviewed  recounted  instances  where 
members of the Qaddafi-controlled military actively supplied the rebels with 
ammunition and information about commencing troop movements. They also 
spoke of  several  occasions  when rebel  spies  informed the opposition  forces 
about active regime informants in their midst, which was highly controversial 
(interview no.  3).  Such examples of  (counter)intelligence were all  important 
6  Libya is divided into three major regions: Tripolitania, Fezzan and Cirrenaica, comprised of some 140 
different tribes of which 30 had some or major influence on the country’s politics (Bell and Wittier 2011, 17).
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during the course of the conflict and family (tribal) ties were always decisive in 
transmitting information from one side to the other and vice-versa. Added to 
this, the military fragmentation of the opposition remained constant throughout 
the conflict as various cities, regions and even some neighborhoods in larger 
cities  formed  independent  militias  primarily  equipped  with  weapons  they 
themselves had seized from the regime troops and loyalists. The protest form, or 
rather the internationally assisted civil war, therefore remained violent and its 
effects clearly affected the remaining transition process.
The Libyan Socio-Political System 
Libya  has  a  particularly  small  population  in  relation  to  its  territorial  size 
(averaging just 4 people per square kilometer), but it holds the fifth largest oil 
reserves  in  the  world  (OPEC  2012).  With  a  traditionally  weak  state 
administration,  a  tribal-based civil  society  and a  cult-based political  system, 
Libya is a state unlike any of its regional neighbors. These issues played a role 
at the outset of the civil conflict. For instance, it was clear early on that protests 
in certain regions of Libya were far more intensive than those in others.  As 
previously  mentioned,  the  regime anticipated  more  extensive  protests  in  the 
capital and some other urban centers in the western part of the country. Tripoli, 
Qaddafi’s city of birth Sirte, the important administrative city of Misrata and the 
desert city of Bani Walid (home of the largest Libyan tribe Warfalla, located 
south of Tripoli) were under far stricter regime control than other regions in the 
distant east. 
Why was this so? In order to answer this question it is important to look 
at the Libyan power structure, its internal dynamics and consequences for the 
revolt.  Modern Libyan society has traditionally  been loosely bound together 
through religious and cultural customs that have evolved slowly over the past 
two  centuries  or  so.  Due  to  its  hot  and  dry  climate,  lack  of  immediately 
accessible natural resources, and lack of abundant water resources, population 
growth remained unusually low in comparison to the rest of the North African 
region.  It  was in the mid-20th century that  substantial  oil  reserves were first 
discovered, pushing the country’s socio-economic development forward. 
Due to the post-colonial regimes’ historical inability to control the vast 
territory of the country, previous incapability or unwillingness in the Ottoman 
Empire’s management of the region and subsequent attempts and failures by 
Italian  (and  also  French  and  British)  colonial  projects,  society  remained 
politically and administratively fragmented for far longer than it did in Libya’s 
neighboring countries (Ahmida 1994; Obeidi 2001). In fact, “Libyan society has 
been fractured, and every national institution, including the military, is divided 
by the cleavages of kinship and region. As opposed to Tunisia and Egypt, Libya 
has  no  system  of  political  alliances,  network  of  economic  associations,  or 
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national organizations of any kind. Thus, what seemed to begin as nonviolent 
protests similar to those staged in Tunisia and Egypt soon became an all-out 
secession -- or multiple separate secessions -- from a failed state” (Anderson 
2011, 6). Even though the level of urbanization in Libya is far higher than in 
neighboring countries, it is thus crucial to consider the central role of clan and 
tribe,  i.e.  family  ties,  in  any  form  of  politically-oriented  collective  action. 
Libyan civil society is therefore far less ideologically fragmented than is the 
case in Tunisia, Egypt or even Algeria. Loyalty is given first and foremost to 
family and its extended leadership (e.g. senior patriarch), which in turn creates a 
case-specific socio-political dynamic.
For instance, the popular uprisings against Qaddafi regime brought many 
historically confirmed underlying socio-political contentions to the surface. In 
the  aftermath  of  the  revolution  it  seems  that  the  fact  that  Libya  is  deeply 
fragmented along the tribal divisions cannot be underestimated (Obeidi 2001). 
The tribe, albeit in its modern and urbanized form, requires allegiance from its 
members and this becomes even more significant in times of insecurity and a 
lack of proper state administration. It must be noted however, that the allegiance 
of  tribe  members  to  their  respective  group  has  never  been  unconditional 
(interview no. 2). 
Sociology  professor  and  MENA  region  expert  Mohammed  Bamyeh 
makes  an  interesting  connection  between some historical  events  and current 
tribal constellations. Just as during the “Italian occupation of Libya from 1911-
1943, contemporary tribal discourse blends with and is clearly subordinate to a 
collective  patriotism,  which  forms  the  root  of  the  current  national  struggle. 
Since  this  movement  began,  Libya’s  various  tribes  have  issued  numerous 
statements about the situation, which largely reflect the patriotism that pervades 
these associations”. An examination of a sample of 28 tribal declarations issued 
between  February  23  and  March  9  2011  reveals  that  the  vast  majority 
highlighted national unity or national salvation rather than tribal interests. 
These  declarations  also  demonstrate  that  Libya’s  tribes  are  not 
homogenous  entities,  but  are  comprised  instead  of  diverse  members  with 
varying social and economic backgrounds. This reality applies to Libyan society 
as a whole, which has a 90% urban population and in which inter-marriages 
across  tribal  lines  are  common.  Such  declarations  emphasize  the  fluidity  of 
tribal  solidarities,  calling  for  a  more  complex  understanding  of  the  tribal 
“system”. For instance, “only 25% of the tribal declarations examined claimed 
to have been issued in the name of the tribe as a whole. More commonly, the 
practice  appears  to  have  been  that  declarations  were  issued  in  the  name of 
specific sections or locations of a tribe (43%), or alternatively spoke in the name 
of the tribe as  a  whole but  proceeded to list  its  locations  as  if  to  implicitly 
exempt  those  residing  elsewhere  (32%).  Of  the  total  28  declarations,  39% 
included a  bara’a statement, which dissociates the tribe from named relatives 
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who are high-ranking officials still serving in the regime” (Bamyeh 2011). 
Libya’s  tribal  divisions  are  usually  complemented  with  sub-divisions 
(clans) spread over three major administrative (historical) regions. It must be 
noted that most tribes (and their clans) share many common practices, social 
codes, and values.7 The unification project began immediately after Libya’s de-
facto independence.  This  serious and to  a  great  extent  successful  attempt  to 
unite the three regions under unitary rule occurred prior to the ascension of the 
Qaddafi  regime  following  a  coup  d’état.  From  24  December  1951  to  1 
September  1969  the  monarchical  rule  of  King  Idris  I  (d.  1983)  provided 
coherent political authority throughout what is Libya today. The system had all 
the features of a parliamentary monarchy. The National Congress (parliament) 
comprised  of  tribal  representatives  and  supported  by  the  occupying  British 
authorities  elected  Idris,  previously  a  provincial  leader  of  Cyrenaica  (east 
region) monarch, thus unifying the three regions under his rule.
King Idris, who was of Algerian descent, derived much of his legitimacy 
from the Senussi religious tradition established by his family, one of the most 
influential reformist movements and originating in the eastern city of Bayda. 
The Senussi religious tradition is embedded in grassroots organization. Based 
on a specific interpretation of Islamic tradition, it gathered a large amount of 
followers  throughout  the  late  19th and  early  20th century.  Its  leaders  and 
members preached rebellion against  Ottoman rule and later  led much of the 
armed resistance against  the Italian  colonial  authorities.  The movement  thus 
developed a tradition of resistance to foreign authority, establishing a positive 
reputation in  terms of  civil  society activism, religious tradition and political 
leadership. It was therefore no surprise to the population of the three regions 
when a senior member of the Senussi family was elected king. Among others, 
one of the most  important historical figures in Libya’s contemporary history 
was  Umar  Al-Mukhtar  (d.  1931)  a  resistance  leader  during  the  Italian 
occupation  from 1913 to  his  death  and  a  dedicated  member  of  the  Senussi 
movement. 
The Senussi religious and political tradition was generally considered as 
an  appropriate  method  to  bridge  tribal  differences  and  solve  inter-tribal 
disagreements  (McGuirk  2007).  This  was  the  solution  attempted  in  the 
establishment of a constitutional monarchy, with the hope being that a federal 
state  arrangement  headed  by  a  representative(s)  of  a  respectable  political 
tradition would unify various tribes and disparate regions. In the progression of 
country’s  inconsistent  institutional  development  the discovery of  massive oil 
7  Regions:  a)  Tripolitania,  b)  Cyrenaica  and  c)  Fezzan.  Major  tribes:  Al-Awager,  Warfalla,  Tarhona, 
Wershifana, Al-Fwatir, Awlad Busayf, Al-Zintan, Al-Rijban, Al-Awagir, Al-Abaydat, Drasa, Al-Barasa, Al-
Fawakhir, Al-Zuwayya, Al-Majabra, Al-Msmare, Al-Qaddadfa, Al-Magarha, Al-Magharba, Al-Riyyah, Al-
Haraba, Al-Zuwaid, Al-Guwaid, Al-Hutman, Al-Hassawna; Toubou, various Tuareg tribes, Al-Zuwayya; 
Toubou.
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reserves in 1959 contributed to a significant change, if not in its course, most 
definitely in the dynamic of the progression of state development. A new urban 
and  economically  prosperous  middle  class  emerged  as  the  primary  civil 
opposition to the policies of the King. The primary concerns of the emerging 
middle class appear to have been King Idris’ failure or rather his inability to 
integrate  this  developing  element  of  Libyan  civil  society  into  the  decision-
making mechanisms of the state (e.g. the National Congress). Other concerns 
connected to the overall grievance of political exclusion included inequality in 
the  distribution  of  wealth,  rampant  administrative  corruption  and inadequate 
public  services,  all  of  which contributed  to  the  crisis  of  the king’s  political 
authority (Takeyh 2000; Anderson 1986). It is interesting to note that many of 
the grievances voiced against King Idris’ regime were echoed during the latest 
popular revolt. The central difference was the protesters’ critique of the cult of 
Qaddafi and the institutionalized state repression of political opposition.
It  was  on  September  1st 1969  that  the  27-year-old  Colonel  Qaddafi, 
together with 70 officer colleagues from the Army, took over the government 
without meeting much resistance. These men were all  members of relatively 
disadvantaged  (small)  Libyan  tribes,  as  well  as  critical  urban  middle  class 
professionals and thus part of the politically disadvantaged population. The aged 
King  was  deposed  and  Qaddafi  proclaimed  Libya  an  Arab  Republic  (ref.). 
Qaddafi seems to have been inspired by the 1952 Free Officers’ “revolution” in 
Egypt and its transformation from a monarchy to a republic. The entire process 
of  the coup d’état  in  Cairo was emulated by the Libyan Free Officers  who 
hoped  to  create  a  socialist  style  political  system,  well  anchored  in  Arab 
nationalism, and thus produce national unity and subsequently (total) political 
control.  Qaddafi’s  political  project  gradually  evolved into  a  totalitarian-style 
state where the leader used popular rhetoric combined with ruthless repression 
to  control  all  elements of  civil  and political  life.  State  institutions remained 
underdeveloped, viewed as potential hotspots of opposition, and were left  to 
deteriorate  as  Qaddafi  disbanded the (tribally  based)  National  Congressional 
Council.  Nevertheless,  tribal  belonging  and  traditional  values  persisted  and 
were  utilized  thoroughly  by  the  regime.  For  instance,  direct  interpersonal 
dealings came to dominate domestic administrative procedures, allowing a great 
amount  of  corruption  and  personal  favoritism  to  dominate  governmental 
practices.  At  the  higher  levels  of  government,  Qaddafi  would  personally 
communicate with a limited number of representatives who would oversee and 
follow up all political decisions and their implementation (see Obeidi 2011). 
In  1977  Qaddafi  made  an  innovative  attempt  to  institutionalize  these 
inter-personal relations by integrating them into a political system he dubbed 
Jamahiriyyah  (“self-rule of the masses”). This system was supposed to be an 
innovative  program  enabling  Libyans  to  self-apply  a  set  of  (Qaddafi’s) 
governing principals which may be described as a form of direct democracy.8 In 
8 Qaddafi authored a text explaining his ideas to the nation entitled the Green Book 
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this effort, local popular councils (Popular Social Committees) were created to 
deal  with  neighborhood  issues  such  as  arbitration  between  individuals,  land 
distribution, and a form of representation of communal interests at the regional 
and national levels of authority. In reality however, the system of local councils 
was based on the personal interests of a select few (usually local representatives 
sympathetic to the regime) who were supported by the Qaddafi regime and who 
could protect the regime’s interests in return for various kinds of benefits (e.g. 
housing, building permits,  employment etc.).  The councils were in effect the 
regime’s control mechanisms at the local level, safeguarding it from opposition 
(Takeyh  2008,  160).  Moreover,  the  committees  protected  their  interests  by 
preventing any regime opposition in their own ranks that would render them 
liable  to  sanctions  from the  regime  (e.g.  violence,  imprisonment  etc.).  This 
primitive form of neopatrimonial rule designed by Qaddafi himself backfired in 
a situation where the overwhelming majority of the population gradually came 
to consider this form of authority both inefficient and ultimately illegitimate. 
The role of the military also shifted over time as power struggles between 
various  military  officers  increasingly  threatened  Qaddafi’s  control  over  the 
government.  There  are  four  known  incidents  where  army  officers  were 
implicated in attempts to overthrow Qaddafi. This increasing threat from within 
the ranks of the regime led Qaddafi  to purposefully  weaken the military by 
creating parallel (para-)military structures with elite brigades, all of which were 
controlled by his immediate family (Barany 2011, 34).
It  can  be argued that  Qaddafi’s  repression relied  both on cultural  and 
(state)  institutional  components,  including  patron-client  networks.  Qaddafi 
utilized the potential of networks and institutions to his advantage by making 
any form of internal opposition highly precarious (see Linz and Stepan 1996 on 
sultanistic regimes). Other socio-political peculiarities (e.g. tribal and regional 
diversity and an economy based on oil production), inter-tribal distrust and the 
perpetual  power  struggle  between  the  major  tribes  all  contributed  to  the 
concentration of power in Qaddafi’s hands. Combined, these factors contributed 
greatly to an individually-based repressive political system. It can therefore be 
argued that the system’s irregularity before the February 17 revolution was both 
its strength and its weakness. Nevertheless, the intricacies of the inner workings 
of the regime throughout the four decades of Qaddafi rule remain unknown and 
out of the bounds of scholarly research, and therefore hard to properly explain. 
Others have attempted to tackle the regime’s intricate structure, but have 
only been able to speak of outcomes, not mechanisms. “The structure, mandate 
and  reporting  lines  of  Libya’s  various  security  agencies  described  above, 
including  the  Kata’eb  and  the  Revolutionary  Committees  remain  unclear  to 
outside observers. Transparency and accountability mechanisms are limited to 
an  extreme.  This  amorphous  system,  in  the  Commission’s  view,  reflects  a 
purposeful policy to obfuscate responsibility as well as to minimize any threat 
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to  the  central  control  of  Colonel  Qadhafi  himself.  The  most  important 
characteristic of these security organizations is that they are neither subject to 
institutional  political  control  nor  to  control  by  the  public  but  have  been 
controlled  exclusively  by  the  Revolutionary  Leadership  led  by  Colonel 
Qadhafi” (Cerone 2011, 790). Ultimately, Libya came to be a militarized state 
practically  under the personal  ownership of  Qaddafi  and his  family.  He had 
succeeded in coopting all levels of civil society that could potentially challenge 
his regime. We can thus see that the traditions of tribal mediation, deliberation, 
communication etc. were totally subordinated, if not entirely destroyed, by the 
regime. 
In terms of the impact of the regime’s repression we can mention another 
example from the late 1980s. This is when it became clear that Qaddafi had 
failed  to  institutionalize  his  vision  of  Jamahiriyyah, causing  his  efforts  to 
control  the  state  and  society  through  ever  more  repressive  strategies.  This 
tightening  of  authoritarian  control  provoked  the  formation  of  a  loosely 
connected  opposition  group  among  the  more  religious  layers  of  society  in 
Cyrenaica,  awakening  its  Senussi  traditions  (interview  no.  1;  see  also 
Cruickshank and Lister 2011 for further examples of Islamization from below). 
It can therefore be argued that a byproduct of this Islamic awakening was 
the formation of a violent Islamist opposition. In the early 1990s, when many of 
the  Libyan  mujahideen  returned  from  the  Afghan-Soviet  war,  the  Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was formed and attached itself to a growing 
violent Islamist trend. The same period saw the rise of violent opposition in 
both Algeria and Egypt. The LIFG’s original goal was to depose the Qaddafi 
regime and establish an Islamist government. Between 1995 and 1998 the LIFG 
waged low-intensity guerilla-style war against the Qaddafi regime several times, 
attempting to assassinate him (see Ashour 2012). During the same period the 
already  established  Libyan  Muslim  Brotherhood  had  further  developed  its 
infrastructure,  but  never  challenged the regime through violent  mobilization. 
The  increase  in  regime repression  also  incited  a  tribal  rebellion  by  Libya’s 
largest tribe, Warfalla, which challenged the regime and the biased distribution 
of  power.  In  sum,  these  disruptive  events  placed  increased  pressure  on  the 
regime to address these various forms of dissent. 
The regime had first responded by beginning a campaign of social and 
educational Islamization programs throughout Libya, a move which took much 
of the edge away from the Islamist opposition. The regime increased funding for 
mosque-run social programs and religious education, and established a national 
network  of  Islamic  study  circles.  Moreover,  the  regime  initiated  targeted 
repression tactics which saw the security forces arrest, kill and incapacitate the 
entire LIFG network. This effectively ended the LIFG’s campaign of violence in 
1998 (Ashour 2012). Important figures from the violent Islamist movement who 
had survived the conflict with the regime were integrated into the work of the 
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NTC,  which  considered  the  LIFG’s  more  pragmatic  activists  long-standing 
dissidents  and  thus  a  significant  asset  in  terms  of  their  organizational  and 
military capabilities during the civil conflict. For instance, Abdelhakim Belhadj, 
an  Afghan  veteran  who had  fought  with  the  mujahideen against  the  Soviet 
occupation in the late 1980s, was appointed as the highest leader of the now 
defunct  Libyan revolutionary army.  In 2002 he was detained by the CIA in 
Malaysia and extradited to Libya,  where he was imprisoned for seven years 
before his release in 2010 as part of a de-radicalization process in the country. 
He is today one of the leaders of the newly formed Islamist “Homeland” party, 
which can be ideologically placed to the right of the Muslim Brotherhood.9
During much of the 2000s, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political activism 
seemed to have melted into the regime supported Islamic social networks where 
the group remained socially active, but politically dormant, until the outbreak of 
the 2011 revolt.10 In the post-revolt elections the MB became the second largest 
party represented in the parliament winning roughly 25 percent of the votes (see 
Eljarh  2012;  Gumuchian  and  Hadeel,  2012;  Salem  and  Kadlec  2012; 
Kirkpartick 2012). 
Regarding  the  rebellion  of  the  Warfalla  tribe  in  1993,  this  had  been 
suppressed  partially  through  targeting  the  key  individuals  in  the  tribe  who 
seemed  most  critical  of  Qaddafi’s  rule.  However,  by  far  the  most  effective 
regime strategy to curb the Warfalla rebellion was to include a greater number 
of its representatives in the political system and thus increase economic benefits 
for the majority of the members of the tribe. At the end of 1990s it was obvious 
that Qaddafi was keen to include the Warfalla (and Maqarha) tribe(s) in many 
official  institutions,  albeit  with certain reservations regarding the military. In 
order to prevent,  or at least discourage, any future eruption of discontent,  in 
1997  the  Libyan  equivalent  of  a  representative  body  (the  General  People’s 
Congress) passed  the decision on the “code of honor” (see UNHCHR 1997). 
This effectively meant that any socio-political opposition to the regime with or 
without  “tribal”  implications  would  result  in  collective  punishment  of  that 
specific tribe, family or/and extended network of the particular person involved 
in “obstructing the people’s authority” (UNHCHR 1997). In practice this meant 
that any citizen and anyone they were associated with was a potential target for 
the regime’s punitive action. This in turn resulted in widespread public fear and 
suspicion of any “outsiders”, e.g. any person outside one’s family circle, tribe, 
or even close friends. There had been many cases where the families and even 
the entire tribes of certain detainees had been pushed to denounce, disown, and 
even accuse their relatives who had been arrested for “plotting” against the State 
(interview no. 3; see Obeidi 2011).
By the end of the 1990s Qaddafi had increased his personal control over 
9 http://wattan.ly
10 http://www.ab.ly/ar/
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the security forces by creating a special elite-military unit named the “People’s 
Guard”,  composed  of  select  loyalists  who  were  personally  dedicated  to 
protecting  Qaddafi’s  family  and  the  regime  infrastructure,  especially  from 
“internal enemies” (Mattes 2004). This included increasing pressure on both the 
economic and religious “elites” (Black 2011). Qaddafi’s fear of losing control 
over economic assets was one of the main issues during the civil conflict, when 
many of the battles between the revolutionaries and the Qaddafi troops took 
place around the oil-fields (see Chulov 2011). For instance, during the early 
days of the revolutionary uprisings a part of the economic sector turned against 
the regime, which strengthened the opposition substantially. As early as March 
2011  the  Arabian  Gulf  Oil  Company,  the  second-largest  state-owned  oil 
company in Libya, announced plans to use oil funds to support anti-Gaddafi 
forces. Islamic leaders and clerics in Libya, notably the Network of Free Ulema 
– Libya urged all  Muslims to rebel  against  Gaddafi.  In turn,  the key tribes, 
Warfalla, Tuareg and Magarha announced their support for the protesters. The 
Zuwayya tribe, based in eastern Libya, threatened to cut off oil exports from 
fields in its part of the country if Libyan security forces continued attacking 
demonstrators. Such economic and collective defections caused great harm to 
the regime and had a considerable impact on the outcome of the rebellion (see 
ICG 2011; Small Arms Survey 2012; interview no. 3). 
Bearing  in  mind  these  considerations  it  is  plausible  to  argue  that  the 
regime  resorted  to  several  strategies,  often  carried  out  simultaneously,  in 
countering the opposition. Most significantly, in the face of institutional failure 
regarding  the  regime’s  creation  of  systematized  rule  based  on  Qaddafi’s 
ideology and/or personality-based rule, the leader resorted (again) to traditional 
forms  of  governance,  namely  the  tribally-based  councils.  Qaddafi  therefore 
sought  to  “re-tribalize”  the  Libyan polity  in  order  to  utilize  long-simmering 
tensions  between  various  tribes.  He  was  thus  able  to  sanction  and  rule  the 
powerful tribal regions and urban centers without much organized opposition 
(see Mattes 2004; Obeidi  2011; 2004). He thus seemed to have reduced the 
institutional  costs  of  running  a  large  state  administration,  securing  his  rule 
through a handful of trusted people who managed inter-regional/tribal dealings. 
These dealings were carried out through a strict security system based on the 
code of honor, tight communal discipline and the threat of harsh sanctions for 
any opposition to the regime. In this way the Qaddafi regime used all available 
resources  to  boost  its  capacity  for  control  and  administrative  resources  as 
mechanisms of coercion, all with the intention of making Libyans comply with 
state policies – total submission and obedience to the leadership. 
Qaddafi’s shifting but relentlessly authoritarian mode of rule had several 
negative  impacts  on  Libyan  civil  society.  Multiple  attempts  to  reform  the 
political and social system were in reality power experiments in ruling strategies 
to  satisfy  Qaddafi’s  totalitarian  ambitions.  Experiments  with  this  form  of 
totalitarianism seemed to have resulted in a docile and impotent political culture 
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among large  segments  of  the  population throughout  much of  the  1980s and 
1990s, despite occasional violent flare-ups of Islamist anti-regime mobilization. 
To clarify, the regime did not operate only through sheer force, but also through 
creating  a  lasting  sense  of  fear  and  suspicion  among  the  general  public.  It 
therefore follows that the majority of people felt they had more to gain in life by 
remaining politically passive. This in turn produced a sense of powerlessness 
with  regard  to  the  authoritarian  regime,  causing  most  people  to  retreat  to 
traditional forms of socialization, i.e. the tribe and the family became the main 
sources of security, stability and solace (interview n. 2). The tribal networks had 
remained largely intact despite a high level of urbanization, but these networks 
assumed another role in the contexts of an increasingly unpredictable political 
atmosphere.  This  account  of  the  dynamics  of  Qaddafi’s  rule  represents  a 
structural  framework  through  which  Qaddafi  developed  his  authoritarian 
system.  The  complexity  of  inter-personal  relationships  could  be  further 
developed using network analysis  to  untangle  the intricate  web of relations. 
However, this would not further the explanation of the breakout and shape of 
the 2011 revolt. 
It  can  be  argued  that  the  regime’s  miscalculation  of  the  protesters’ 
commitment and willingness to sacrifice and persist proved fatal. I believe that 
the  regime’s  previous  experiences  with  tribal  and Islamist  rebellions  shaped 
much of their security strategizing, in terms of not considering a non-Islamist 
driven nationwide rebellion. In the end, the regime relied on the elite’s inter-
personal  relations  and  tribal  alliances,  as  did  the  opposing  NTC  and  the 
revolutionaries. When those alliances and interdependency started to fall apart 
through the defection of important government officials and army officers, the 
power structure was unable to sustain its cohesion and resistance.  Here, one 
cannot underestimate the role of international actors in the process of system 
disintegration.  Direct  international  involvement  under the auspices of  NATO 
contributed both to polarization in the Libyan public, but also to defections from 
Qaddafi’s inner circle. When NATO’s bombardment of military infrastructure 
targets prompted the regime to rely more heavily on tribally-based allegiance, 
the support  of  loyal  tribes to  the Qaddafi  family  was clearly not  enough to 
sustain the old system. 
What started as popular protests against bureaucratic corruption and the 
regime’s  old  ills  inspired  by  the  popular  revolts  in  Tunisia  and  later  Egypt 
developed into an open civil conflict. It is clear that once the barrier of fear was 
breached (for a significant segment of the population) the (armed) rebellion was 
difficult to avoid. This was not least due to the regime’s resolution to resort to 
all means to maintain its control. The Assad regime in Syria has shown similar 
determination and survival skills; yet in a far more complex and sectarian social 
context. In the light of the above presented arguments we can conclude that the 
social media’s role in the evolution of the uprising was rather limited. “(G)iven 
the  very  different  trajectory  of  the  Libyan  uprising—namely,  its  rapid 
30
metamorphosis from unarmed protests to armed rebellion to international war—
the importance of social media as a catalyzing force for revolution took a back 
seat.  Twitter’s influence paled in comparison to NATO bombs” (Fahim  et al 
2011, A1). 
Starting Anew?
During the period of Qaddafi’s rule all meaningful, or rather independent, forms 
of civil  society organizations were prohibited (Clark 2011).  In the post civil 
conflict period we see an extraordinary surge in the development of Libyan civil 
society. New civil society organizations (CSOs) are mushrooming in the context 
of the new political system and the lack of any coherent institutional order to 
regulate the shape and form of CSOs. Moreover, Qaddafi’s 42 years in power 
severely limited Libya’s most productive generations, those in their 30s and 40s. 
Most  of  these  individuals  are  relatively  uneducated,  inexperienced,  deeply 
distrustful of outsiders (even Libyans from other tribes or regions other than 
their own), and largely unprepared administer the institutions, or for that matter, 
civil  society  organizations  (see  Anderson  2011).  This  is  perhaps  the  most 
precarious element present in the post-election period. 
In the aftermath of the civil conflict Libyan civil society stands before 
new challenges.  As noted above,  the initially fragmented opposition evolved 
from disorganized and regional groups of protesters into a relatively coherent 
coalition with a representative political body which could voice and formulate 
their collective demands to the regime and the international community. The 
opposition’s military organization and capabilities were far more ambiguous and 
hard to control for the representative body (i.e. the NTC) from very early on. 
For instance, before the parliamentary elections (in July 2011) the NTC sought 
to  dismantle  Qaddafi’s  military  structure,  but  this  in  turn  destabilized  the 
security situation even further. As we have seen, Libya had long suffered from 
the absence of a central security and defense authority that could protect the 
country and its people. The military infrastructure was primarily designed to 
protect the ruling family and their elite allies. 
In the post-conflict period different (armed) revolutionary organizations 
were supposed to take up the task of maintaining order. However, due to the 
immanent power vacuum various factions began fighting amongst themselves. 
Many of these clashes were the result of various groups’ control over resources, 
institutions,  territory,  old  grudges  and  power-positioning  with  the  new 
government  (BBC  News 2011c).  The  outcome  of  the  disintegration  of  the 
country’s security has thus far had the effect of slowing down the process of 
forming a new government, state institutions, regional integration, and coherent 
socio-political security. Simmering tensions between the Libyan east and west 
continue to cause friction among the ruling elites and the newly established 
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parliament. A federal system of government could address these tensions, and 
prevent  their  escalating  and  jeopardizing  the  functioning  of  the  emerging 
political  system.  There  is  still  much  uncertainty  regarding  the  political 
transition. The complexity of civil  society discussed above, unsettled power-
sharing  issues,  and  a  general  sense  of  societal  insecurity  in  the  face  of 
uncontrolled armed militias pose significant obstacles to any prediction about 
the final outcomes of the mobilization (Reuters 2011d; interview no. 3). 
Despite obvious challenges in reviving Libyan civil  society, all  groups 
agree that the authority of the new Libyan government ought to be based on 
popular will. This goes for the various Islamist parties and organizations (except 
for  the  small  fringe  of  violent  militias),  liberal  and  leftist  parties,  women’s 
organizations, Berber tribes and other groups. For instance, all of the initially 
anti-Qaddafi activists, and especially those from Benghazi and the east, used the 
same or similar symbols of resistance. First, there was a widespread revival of 
the  heroic  story  of  Umar  Al-Mukhtar’s  fight  against  the  Italian  occupation. 
Islamists saw this man as an Islamic fighter pitted against foreign non-Muslim 
occupants, emphasizing his piety and religious devotion. Leftists saw him as an 
anti-colonial hero fighting for freedom from foreign capitalist domination, while 
liberals considered him a father of the nation and the greatest Libyan patriot. 
The irony is that Qaddafi  had also venerated the memory of Al-Mukhtar,  to 
some extent at least, naming streets and squares after him. 
Second, the distinct flag of the Libyan monarchy was another important 
symbol  under  which  a  new  political  system  was  to  replace  the  Qaddafi 
dictatorship.  Even though there was no mention of returning to monarchical 
rule,  the  flag  was used as  a  symbol  of  the  continuation  of  the  independent 
Libyan state that existed prior to the Qaddafi-led putsch. Moreover, one of the 
most important reasons behind the insistence on establishing a federal system in 
Libya by opposition groups from Benghazi  was  the way the monarchy was 
organized.  King  Idris  was  skillful  in  balancing  the  different  regions’ socio-
economic  interests,  not  allowing  any  one  region  to  dominate  others.  The 
discussion about this issue is by no means settled and will need to be addressed 
in  the  future.  It  is  hard  to  speculate  about  any  one  particular  outcome 
concerning the type of political system we will see in Libya; or indeed whether 
the rapidly evolving political culture will  produce a more representative and 
pluralistic form of government. 
Summary
The  Libyan  anti-regime  masses,  representing  middle  class  professionals, 
intellectuals, former government officials, unemployed urban youths, Islamist 
organizations and female activists  were all  involved in  toppling the Qaddafi 
regime in one  way or  another.  Representatives  from these  various  layers  of 
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Libyan civil  society  are  all  very  much  active  in  reshaping  the  base  of  that 
society  now.  A high level  of  urbanization  and a  relatively  small  population 
facilitate  the  acquisition  of  many  of  the  logistical  components  needed  for 
creating a domestic discussion about the various aspects of the future Libyan 
political  arrangement.  Media outlets  and non-governmental  organizations are 
contributing to massive “democratic” output through which the public feels that 
it is participating in a meaningful debate over their collective future.
For instance, on February 7 2012, almost a year after the rebellion, the 
NTC drafted a constitution, which, at the time of writing, is under revision after 
the election of the General National Congress (elected on August 8 2012). This 
is  the  latest  constitutional  development  in  a  string  of  constitutional  changes 
dating from Libyan independence in 1951 that took place up to the military-led 
revolution  that  replaced  the  constitutional  monarchy  with  the  Constitutional 
Proclamation of December 1969. In 1977, Libya became a state of ruled by the 
masses - Jamahiriyyah - only to be overruled by the mass uprising in February 
2011.  It  remains to  be seen however what  the new constitutional  order  will 
evolve into. The most significant change will undoubtedly be the formation of a 
civil state with a functioning (in whatever way) institutional framework that will 
democratize vital decision-making structures.
Regarding the role of the media in the continued transition process we 
can conclude that ever since the first  days of the revolt,  when the protesters 
seized the regime’s local radio stations in cities across Libya, an information 
revolution has taken place. Anti-regime activists learned early on that they could 
attract  both national  and international  support  through the avid collection of 
visual  digital  material  of  the  massive  protests  in  Libya.  Protesters  usually 
downloaded digital photographs and videos of the demonstrations, showing the 
security  forces  brutalizing  and  often  killing  activists.  Since  no  foreign  or 
domestic media were reporting these demonstrations, the activists came to be 
amateur field-“journalists” aiming to show the brutality of the regime. This can 
clearly  be  compared  to  anti-regime  protesters’ documentation  of  protests  in 
Tunisia, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and other places. 
These efforts played an important role in attracting international support 
for  the  activists,  particularly  in  the  form of  the  U.S.  and  European  NATO 
intervention  supported  by  the  Arab  League.  When  the  international  media 
finally, after weeks of protests, gained access to the opposition stronghold in 
Benghazi,  they  were  invited  to  make  use  of  terabytes  of  documentation. 
Information was made available through access to a server in the international 
pressroom in the "17 February Media Centre" in the old Benghazi courthouse. 
Because  of  the  careful  cataloguing of  the material  hundreds  of  international 
journalists had quick and easy access and verification of sources, and a chance 
to work in a more in-depth way. In the aftermath of the conflict more than 100 
media outlets – newspapers, radio stations, TV stations and Internet news sites 
33
have appeared.
In  sum,  the  factors  that  were  arguably  crucial  to  the  eruption  of  the 
popular  revolt  in  Libya  are  the  weakening  regime,  incompetent  government 
administration, disgruntled tribal allies,  deeply dissatisfied urban populations, 
and support from (the important parts) of the international community for the 
opposition. As with other regional revolts that have taken place in recent time, 
especially  those  concerning  democratic  transitions,  political  changes  will 
inevitably take time to take root and there will be a “democratization process in 
progress” for years to come. The domestic political process will be an ongoing 
one, involving setbacks as well as advances. The sudden occurrence of political 
setbacks should not be viewed as spelling total failure of the process, but as a 
series  of  obstacles  that  need  to  be  overcome  as  part  of  the  political 
transformation to civil governance. This will ultimately have implications for 
how Libya manifests its new national and political identity.
Situating Libya in the larger regional  context  we can observe that  the 
Libyan society and state (infra)structure is highly dissimilar to those of Egypt 
and  Tunisia,  both  of  which  had  relatively  well  developed  constitutional 
traditions and functioning state institutions, however corrupt. It is for this reason 
that  the  transition  from authoritarian  rule  in  Libya  also  includes  a  delicate 
process of state building. The country therefore faces more serious challenges 
than those raised by the task of democratizing the system. While protests in 
Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt appear similar on the surface, appealing to tenets of 
patriotism and dignity, they were in reality only able to take hold because of 
local  circumstances that  made the demands for  popular  rule and anti-regime 
symbolism salient to the population. 
34
Factsheet
Population 5613380 (July 2012 est.)
0-14 years 32.80% (Male 1104590 Female 1057359)
15-64 years 62.70% (Male 2124053 Female 2011226)
65 years and over 4.60% (Male 146956 Female 153776)
(2011 est.)
source  : cia.gov  
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